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BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Lileth Shelley, Respondent herein, by and through counsel
Phillip B. Shell, files this brief in opposition to the Petition
for Writ of Certiorari previously filed by the Appellants herein.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellants present three issues for review:

First, were Mrs.

Shelley's complaints of pain medically sufficient to establish the
sole etiology of her pre-existing condition; second, did the Court
of Appeals err in modifying Allen v. Industrial Commission by
making qualitative distinctions between types of pre-existing
conditions in determining whether to apply the higher standard of
legal causation; and third, does the Court of Appeals* decision
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maintain the "clear and workable rule for future application of the
Commission' as established in Allen v. Industrial Commission.
The Respondents oppose the granting of the Writ on all three
issues, for the reasons set out hereinafter.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to the provisions
of Section 78-2-2(5), Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended).

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The Respondent submits that there are no specific determinative
constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, or rules in
connection with this case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent does not have any major disagreements with the facts
as cited by the Appellants in their brief.

However, it may be

helpful to stress what Respondent deems to be important in the
Court's consideration of the facts:
1.

Respondent Lileth Shelley was 50 years old at the time of

the 1985 industrial injury in question.

At that time she had been

employed by the Appellant for over 13 years as a warehouse worker
(R. at 2, 33, 34) .
2.

The 1985 injury occurred while Mrs. Shelly was twisting
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while on a ladder in lifting a 35 lb. box of shower curtains over
the protective railing of the ladder (R. at 35, 36).
3.

Mrs. Shelley had sustained two prior low back injuries,

both occurred while on the job and while employed by the Appellant
or its predecessor in interest.

The first injury occurred in 1975

while she was lifting a 35 to 40 lb. case of shoes (R. at 62). The
second low back injury occurred in 1978 when Mrs. Shelley was
bending over a waist high case containing boxes of tightly packed
underwear.

As she was struggling to remove the boxes from the

case, she felt her back pop (R. at 54).
4.

The Respondent received medical treatment from Dr. Harold

P. Hargreaves for each of the two prior injuries.

She was also

treated by Dr. Allred after the 1978 injury and wore a corset for
about five months following this injury.

She testified that after

these injuries, she had occasional problems with her back (R. at
55, 306).
5.

Mrs. Shelley's medical history shows no other prior or

subsequent injuries to her back.

The medical records further give

no indication of any disease or back problem of any kind prior to
the initial injury in 1975 (R. at 52, 52, 69, 71, 161, 162).
6.

After the 1985 injury, Mrs. Shelley's treating physicians,

Dr. S. William Allred, and Dr. J. Charles Rich, diagnosed Mrs.
Shelley as having a pre-existing condition in 1985 of degenerative
spondylolisthesis, a condition which is often started by trauma to
3

the back.

This was attributed to the prior work injuries (R. at

102, 217, 270, 272).
7.

Mrs. Shelley was rated by Dr. Allred as having a 25% whole

body impairment with 12 1/2% due to the 1985 injury and 12 1/2% due
to the pre-existing problem (R. at 102).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED FOR THE PURPOSE
OF REVIEWING THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
AFFIRMING THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The Writ of Certiorari should not be granted to review the
determination of the Court of Appeals that the factual findings of
the Industrial Commission were not arbitrary nor capricious.
Regardless of how the Appellants phrase the question in their
petition, there was sufficient evidence before the Industrial
Commission upon which to base its factual findings.
The Commission found that Mrs. Shelley's pre-existing condition
was the result of prior industrial accidents incurred while
employed by the same employer. They found no evidence in the record
that any of Mrs. Shelley's back problems pre-dated or existed
independent of her industrial injuries.
The Commission considered the evidence concerning the origin of
the pre-existing condition in order to determine whether it was due
to on-the-job injuries or non-industrial causes.
4

There is no evidence in the record to show that Mrs. Shelley
suffers from any congenital back problem nor that she had any
problems that pre-dated her first back injury in 1975.
At the evidentiary hearing, she testified that the first injury
to her back occurred at work in 1975 (R. at 52). Mrs. Shelley also
testified that she had not had a problem with her back prior to the
1975 injury (R. at 69). Her testimony does not reveal any back
problems other than those ensuing after her three industrial
injuries.
The medical records from the Respondent's treating physicians
further support this.

For example, in the records of Dr. Harold

Hargreaves, M.D., an x-ray summary for a film taken in 1975 states
"Lumbar spine normal." (R. at 162). His records do not reflect any
complaints or treatment relating to the back prior to 1975,
although the Respondent had seen him first in February of 1969 (R.
at 161). The records of Dr. Kenneth Guymon mention a work injury
to the back in May of 1978 and the 1975 back injury three years
before (R. at 171). Although he treated various ills beginning in
1972, there is nothing in Dr. Guymon1s records to suggest of prior
back problems.
In a letter dated June 13, 1985, Dr. J. Charles Rich, M.D., Mrs.
Shelley's neurologist, stated, "...the only episodes of back pain
she has ever had (have) been those related not only with work but
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with this same employer over the course of the last few years." (R.
at 217).
Dr. Rich, in an operative report dated 7/23/85, stated, as to
preoperative and post operative diagnoses, "L5-S1 disk herniation
and degenerative spondylolisthesis.11 (R. at 270).
Degenerative spondylolisthesis is the slipping of one
vertebra over another due to degenerative processes (ie. the result
of trauma) rather than due to congenital defects.
Dr. William Allred, M.D., the treating orthopedic surgeon,
stated in the 7/31/85 discharge summary of a finding of "L5-S1
central disc defect with a bilateral nerve root compression L4-5
and mild degenerative Pseudo-spondylolisthesis." (R. at 272).
Further, Dr. Allred1s 1987

Summary of Medical Record indicates a

50/50 apportionment between pre-existing conditions and the 1985
industrial injury.

In responding to a question of aggravation he

stated as follows:
10. Did the industrial injury aggravate the applicant's preexisting condition?
Yes.

Please explain as necessary.

The patient had had two previous episodes of back pain of

brief duration.
(R. at 102).
After the evidentiary hearing at the Industrial Commission, the
Appellant hired Dr. David Beck to examine Mrs. Shelley for an
independent medical examination.

Dr. Beck, who saw the Respondent
6

only once,

stated the opinion that the 1975 and 1978 injuries

probably have no bearing on Mrs. Shelley's long-term problem.

He

apparently attributed the pre-existing portion of the back problem
to other origins.

However, this is only Dr. Beck's opinion and it

is not supported by any explanation or evidence of any kind (R. at
293, 294).
The Commission, as stated in its final order, found no evidence
in the record to show that any of Mrs. Shelley's back problems were
due to congenital defects or anything pre-dating the first
industrial injury of 1975.

Rather, it found ample reasons for the

factual conclusion that the pre-existing problems in Mrs. Shelley's
back are due to the prior work injuries (R. at 334).
The findings of the Commission are supported by substantial
evidence, are not arbitrary nor capricious, and were properly
affirmed.

The Court of Appeals by its affirmation did not depart

from its accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, nor did
it sanction such a departure by the Industrial Commission as to
call into exercise the Supreme Court's power of supervision.
POINT II
THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE DECISION
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT IN CONFLICT WITH
THE HOLDING IN ALLEN v. IND. COMM.
The Appellants continue to urge that the principles adopted by
the Court in Allen v. Industrial Commission, supra, do not support
the conclusions reached by the Court of Appeals and the Industrial
7

Commission in this matter.

However, Appellant's analysis is flawed

and is incorrect.
In Allen this Court adopted a test which requires, in the
context of legal causation, that a claimant with a pre-existing
condition show that the injury resulted from extra exertion.

A

worker without a pre-existing condition does not have to meet the
higher standard.

The stated reason for the extra exertion

requirement was to determine whether "the employee brings to the
workplace a personal element of risk such as a pre-existing
condition." Allen at 25. The Court stated that the adoption of a
higher standard of legal causation in such a case

would serve to

"offset the pre-existing condition of the employee as a likely
cause of the injury, thereby eliminating claims for impairment
resulting from a personal risk rather than exertion at work." Allen
at 25. (Emphasis added).
If the medical evidence shows that an injured worker's problems
are directly related to the work injury in question, legal
causation should not be defeated on the pretext of a pre-existing
injury where it is established that such pre-existing injury was
created in the same workplace in which the accident in question
occurred.

A worker does not bring any personal element of risk to

the workplace where

any so-called pre-existing conditions are the

result of prior work injuries stemming from that same employment
with the same employer.
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Hence, where a worker brings no pre-existing injury to the
workplace, but has a compensable injury (or injuries) on the job,
and subsequently while on the job sustains an otherwise compensable
injury to the same area of the body, he should not have to meet the
higher legal standard to establish compensability, if the injury
was incurred while working for the same employer.

This is because

the worker's increased risk of injury with respect to the later
claim is attributable strictly to the hazards previously
encountered at that same employment.
In such a situation, the purposes for invoking the higher legal
causation standard do not apply.

There is no reason to shelter the

employer from liability for the last injury.

The language and

reasoning of Allen do not mandate a different conclusion, but in
fact support it.
Appellants would argue that to allow the Court of Appeals'
decision to stand would undermine one of the principal purposes of
Allen; that Allen established a "clear and workable rule for future
application by the Commission." Ld. at 18. However, even if what
Appellants claim were true, the Court of Appeals made the right
determination.
The focus still remains upon whether a worker brings a personal
risk to the workplace.

It is true that employees with identical

medical conditions may be treated in a greatly disparate manner
depending upon the source, or sources, of their disabilities.
9

However, short of a totally socialized system where all disabled
workers receive compensation, regardless of the cause of the
disability, the purposes of the workers compensation system mandate
that if the injury was caused by the workplace, compensation should
be awarded.

Physical conditions which pre-date the job are

appropriately not the responsibility of the employer and its
insurance carrier.

The decision of the Court of Appeals does not

change this and should not be disturbed.
CONCLUSION
The record fully supports the action taken by the Industrial
Commission.

The Commission did not act arbitrarily or abuse its

discretion in finding Mrs. Shelleyfs pre-existing condition to be
job related.

The Court of Appeals acted properly in affirming the

action of the Commission.
The Court of Appeals was justified under the philosophy of the
Allen decision to find that the higher legal standard of causation
does not come into play when the worker brings no personal risk to
the workplace, but suffers from a pre-existing job-related injury
at the time of the final injury.

This is sound policy.

This Court should deny the petition for writ of certiorari.
Respectfully submitted this 30th da^> of January. 1991.

Pftillip B. ^hell
Day & Barney
Attorneys for Respondent Shelley
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